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WE ARE ALL POST-9/11 NOW
Kim Lane Scheppele*
INTRODUCTION
Bruce Ackerman's new book has been published under the title Before
the Next Attack.1 But the book originally had a different title: The Morning
After the Next Attack.2
What's in a title? I think that Ackerman's last-minute title switch points
us to one of the crucial pivot points of his book. The normative viability of
Ackerman's proposals depends on whether we are before or after the next
attack. His willingness to trust that a government would retain its
constitutional sensibility while acting effectively to block a looming threat
relies crucially on that government setting up a plan of action before the
attack, when it is not under the unbearable pressures that will hit it once an
attack occurs. Ackerman believes that before an attack, government will
operate responsibly, without panicking, to correctly balance the trade-offs
between constitutional fidelity and antiterrorism effectiveness. After an
attack, according to Ackerman, emotion, cries for action, and the
overwhelming fear of a possible second attack will likely prevent the
government from accomplishing this balance in a sensible way. 3
After the Next Attack emphasizes the irrationality of the anticipated
response; Before the Next Attack emphasizes the sanity of planning ahead.
If one is giving advice, as Ackerman is clearly doing here, better to
emphasize when the time is right to take advantage of his proposals-
Before the Next Attack, then.
But here is the problem: By the time Ackerman wrote his book, 9/11 had
already happened-and no one expects that 9/11 will be the last attack on
the U.S. by terrorists bent on mass destruction. Practically speaking, then,
at the moment that Ackerman's book was written, the United States was
both after one attack and before another. There was, in short, already no
* Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Public Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School and
the University Center for Human Values; Director, Program in Law and Public Affairs,
Princeton University. Also, Faculty Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I
would like to thank Bruce Ackerman and Sandy Levinson for conversations that improved
this article and Serguei Oushakine for comparative insights.
1. Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack (2006).
2. Bruce Ackerman, The Morning After the Next Attack: Emergency Power in an Age
of Terrorism (2005) (manuscript on file with the Fordham Law Review).
3. Bruce Ackerman, Terrorism and the Constitutional Order, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 475
(2006).
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uncontaminated "before all attacks" moment in which to decide what to do.
Ackerman's new title therefore describes a time that no longer exists as a
possibility in the United States, except as a thought experiment.
Because we are all already post-9/1 1, we all already think about
constitutional trade-offs and effective strategies against terrorism in a
different way. Many constitutional scholars have already advocated the
constitutionally problematic positions that Ackerman thought would follow
an attack. What used to be bedrock constitutional understandings are now
looking na~ive to these self-proclaimed new constitutional realists. To them,
separation of powers and respect for rights may now be options that only
exist in pure form with no terrorists around.4
For starters, I cannot imagine that Ackerman himself would have written
Before the Next Attack before any attack had happened. His proposals
involve radical departures from American constitutional traditions that used
to be a source of pride. Ackerman's earlier writings show him to be a
defender of a robust Constitution, one that changes over time in the
direction of increased rights protection. 5 Would Ackerman have suggested
it would be acceptable for the President to authorize rounding up large
numbers of people and to hold them without charges for "only" forty-five
days6 unless it were already after a Constitution-shattering attack? Or, if a
terrorist attack had not already occurred, would Ackerman have given such
sweeping powers to the President to declare a general emergency in the first
place-even if only for a limited time7-given that the American
Constitution explicitly assigns all emergency powers to Congress (to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus, 8 to declare war,9 to "provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections
and repel Invasions"'0)? I very much doubt that many of the things he
proposes in his new book would have looked like sensible proposals to the
pre-9/11 Ackerman. Before the Next Attack has a post-attack author.
We have already lost the crucial moment on which the normative
persuasiveness of Ackerman's proposals rest. What should we do now?
With the pre-panic moment already gone, I want to suggest that Ackerman
4. See generally John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and
Foreign Affairs After 9/11, at 143-81 (2006) (arguing that the executive possesses more war
powers under the Constitution than the Congress does); Alan M. Dershowitz, Should the
Ticking Time Bomb Terrorist Be Tortured, in Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the
Threat, Responding to the Challenge 131 (2002) (proposing that an absolute ban on torture
be replaced by judicial warrants permitting torture under some circumstances after 9/11);
Richard A. Posner, The Constitution v. Counterterrorism, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 2006, at A12
(discussing how intelligence gathering should not require judicial warrants in the war on
terrorism).
5. See, e.g., 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991).
6. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 3, at 476.
7. Ackerman gives this exclusive power to the President "for a week or two while
Congress is considering the matter." Id.
8. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
9. Id. § 8, cl. 11.
10. Id. ci. 15.
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is absolutely right in his second thought about where we should turn, as
America is tempted to lose its constitutional way after 9/11: We should
look abroad to see what others have done in their moments of terrorist-
induced panic."I
Why go outside the United States? Other countries have had a much
longer experience with pervasive domestic terrorism than has the United
States; other countries have overreacted, failed, and reassessed before us.
Other countries have also succeeded in suppressing terrorism without
abandoning their constitutional commitments, or, if they eliminated the
terrorist threat and lost their constitutional souls in doing so, some managed
to reconstruct themselves again, learning in the process. As the United
States debates what course of action to take, other countries have
performed, both before and after 9/11, political experiments that Americans
might want to assess before striking out on our own. Looking abroad
enables us to take advantage of experience without running ourselves
through the high-stakes experiment first. Perhaps Ackerman's wisest
advice, now that we are all post-9/1 1, is to look abroad before we leap.
I. ACKERMAN'S FOREIGN INSPIRATION
Ackerman's proposals were clearly inspired primarily by a country that
now sees itself as having shamefully overreacted to a terrorist threat. The
South African Constitution, newly launched after the emergency regime
that held apartheid in place, features strictly regulated emergency powers. 12
It includes an "escalator" clause, like Ackerman's, that requires a state of
emergency to be approved by the Parliament with an ever-increasing
majority as the distance from the crisis-triggering event grows. 13
(Ackerman, however, goes beyond the one-time step-up in legislative
approval to propose ever-increasing majorities.) 14 The South African
Constitution also is explicit about which rights can be limited, and for how
long. 15 Some rights must be fully protected even during emergency (life
and human dignity may never be limited; slavery and servitude are never
permitted), while other rights may be temporarily squeezed (free speech and
liberty rights may be infringed for brief periods to handle the threat). 16
11. Ackerman's Fordham article does not reference other countries' practices as much as
does the book. Compare Ackerman, supra note 3, with Ackerman supra note 1.
12. See S. Afr. Const. 1996 § 37, available at
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sfOO00.html.
13. See id. § 37(2)(b).
14. A majority vote would be needed to sustain a President's declaration of emergency
in the moment, but after two months, sixty percent would be required; seventy percent would
be necessary after another two months; and eighty percent would be required for every two-
month extension after that. See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 476.
15. See S. Afr. Const. 1996 § 37(5)-(7).
16. See id. § 37(5)(c).
2006] 609
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
Ackerman suggests something like this too. 17 The crucial point about the
South African model is that there are clear constitutional guidelines that
determine which rights can be limited, how much they may be limited, and
for how long they may be limited.' 8 This is the spirit of Ackerman's
proposals for the United States. Bringing emergencies in from the cold,
incorporating them into a constitution as legally limited states of affairs, is
something that the United States could usefully do. In this, I am in
complete agreement with Ackerman.
But, in my view, Ackerman does not learn enough, even from the South
African example. In addition to the explicit regulation of a state of
emergency that Ackerman takes as a model for the United States, the South
African Constitution puts strong limits on the use of the military in a "state
of national defence"'19 by explicitly requiring the military to adhere to both
the Constitution and international law. 20 When domestic politics counsel
abandoning constitutional protections in precisely the way that Ackerman
cautions us against, the international law of war may more firmly shore up
commitments to the rule of law, separation of powers, and humanitarian
protections precisely because the international community has institutions
that stand outside particular national emergencies. As a result, there may be
sensible voices that can warn more effectively about the consequences of
going off the constitutional rails, and can argue better from the outside than
we can from the inside when there has been a disproportionate response to a
threat. 21 Ackerman's model also should have incorporated the use of
international law to backstop domestic constitutional practice, though the
American government's present hostility to international constraint no
doubt makes this proposal a nonstarter if one wants to have a real influence
on policy. (The inability to "sell" an idea politically at any particular
moment, however, does not mean that the idea is a bad one.) Although
Ackerman does not propose using international law to leverage human
rights protection in this way, it is another lesson one could learn from the
South African model.
In addition to South Africa, other countries with recently enacted
constitutions or recent constitutional amendments have also brought
emergencies inside their constitutional orders, rather than allowing an
17. Ackerman suggests that preventive detention can last no longer than forty-five days
and that torture would be forbidden under all circumstances. See Ackerman, supra note 3, at
476.
18. See S. Afr. Const. 1996 § 37(5)-(7).
19. Id. §§ 200-04.
20. Id. § 200(2).
21. In my own work, however, I have argued that this may no longer be as true as it once
was. After 9/11, so many countries around the world changed their laws to respond to the
terrorist threat that the number of countries that are not themselves in a state of emergency is
declining. The international moves toward the use of emergency powers have occurred in
large part because international institutions required them and coordinated a worldwide
antiterrorism campaign. See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, The International State of
Emergency (unpublished manuscript, on file with author and the Fordham Law Review).
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emergency to set aside the constitution in the name of fighting a threat. In
1968, Germany amended its Basic Law to regulate emergencies
constitutionally, 22  and Russia's 1993 Constitution embedded
constitutionally regulated emergency powers from the start.23  When
Canada revised its Constitution in 1982 to more firmly entrench rights as
legally enforceable claims in the constitutional order, it also enacted a new
emergencies statute that required all emergency powers to be exercised
within the framework of the present Constitution. 24 At the same time,
Canada also repealed the far-reaching War Measures Act, which had
permitted emergencies with few constitutional constraints. 25
That said, none of these new constitutionalized frameworks for
regulating emergency powers has ever been tested, and one hopes they
never will be. In the time since each of these constitutions or constitutional
amendments was adopted, no emergencies have occurred (or at least no
emergencies have been declared) in any of these countries. As a result, we
cannot see whether these constitutional restrictions actually would work in
a time of crisis, or whether the limitations that they attempt to
institutionalize would actually hold executive power accountable during
difficult times. When an emergency is underway, one could imagine all too
easily that a government's supporters in the parliament might delay a vote
that had the potential to end emergency powers, or that the parliament-still
panicked-would go on giving its assent to emergency governance even
without much evidence of a continuing immediate threat. One could further
imagine a democratically elected executive whipping up public fear to the
point where the representatives in the parliament dared not reign in
executive discretion. Additionally, one could imagine courts losing their
nerve in evaluating the need for extreme measures taken by the executive
branch, which might base its claim that there is a serious and looming threat
on information that only it possesses or only it can assess. (Executives can
virtually always say that their knowledge of a threat comes from secret
sources that they claim would be a danger to national security to reveal,
even to legislators or courts.) We do not know in an actual crisis whether
the South African Constitution-or the German, Russian, or Canadian
Constitutions, for that matter-would hold fast, bend, or break if the
emergency provisions were in fact invoked to limit executive action in a
crisis. They have never been put to the test.
22. See Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 80a, 81, 115a (F.R.G.), translated in The
Basic Law (Axel Tschentscher trans., 2003), available at
http://www.jurisprudentia.de/jurisprudentia.html (providing a translation up to and including
amendments of 2003).
23. For example, the Russian Constitution provides a list of rights that cannot be
infringed during a state of emergency. See Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF]
[Constitution] art. 56(3), available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/rs00000.html.
24. Kim Lane Scheppele, North American Emergencies: The Use of Emergency Powers
in Canada and the United States, 4 I-Con: Int'l J. Const. L. 213, 230-31 (2006) [hereinafter
Scheppele, North American Emergencies].
25. Id. at 230.
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Even among countries that have had occasions to use the
constitutionalized powers of emergencies that their own law provides, the
results have not been encouraging. Germany's interwar experience
involved the frequent invocation of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution,
which authorized and limited emergencies, but this constitutionalization of
emergencies did not prevent one of the worst falls from constitutional
governance the world has ever seen.26 Despite having constitutional
emergency provisions in the constitutional text, the Russian government
simply did not invoke them (with their associated limits) to fight the wars in
Chechnya, though the Constitution seems designed for such uses.27 Canada
did not use its emergency statute as a rubric under which to enact the
country's post-9/11 antiterrorism law, even though the post-9/l1 law
permitted constitutionally questionable practices to be justified in the name
of a threat to national security. 28 Constitutionalizing the uses of emergency
powers does not mean that those constitutional provisions will in fact be
used as envisioned in times of emergency.
As a result, though I share Ackerman's sense that it is better to regulate
emergencies inside the constitutional order than to leave emergency powers
to chance and panic, I prefer to look at actually existing emergencies and
how they have come into being, been limited, and eventually been ended
regardless of whether their control was constitutionalized, rather than
holding out high hopes for constitutional blueprints that have not yet been
deployed against real threats. South Africa's own apartheid-era experience
with long-term emergency government, 29 and the experience of other states
that have fought long-term threats (or perceived threats), 30 reveal how
26. On the uses of Article 48 during the Weimar Republic, see Frederick Mundell
Watkins, The Failure of Constitutional Emergency Powers Under the German Republic
(1939).
27. "No state of emergency or martial law has been declared in Chechnya. No federal
law has been enacted to restrict the rights of the population of the area. No derogation under
Article 15 of the Convention has been made." Case of Isayeva v. Russia, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R.
847, 875 (2005).
28. The institution of investigative hearings was one of the most controversial changes
in Canadian law. In this procedure, judges interrogate people alleged to know about terrorist
attacks, and those interrogated have no right to remain silent. The information so collected
cannot be used in criminal prosecutions, however. Another controversial practice extended
preventive detention. See Scheppele, North American Emergencies, supra note 24, at 237-
38.
29. For an account of the South African emergency, see Stephen Ellmann, In a Time of
Trouble: Law and Liberty in South Africa's State of Emergency (1992).
30. For a particularly careful, detailed account of the legal bases for states of emergency
in a number of different countries, see Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, States of Emergency: Their
Impact on Human Rights (1983). The countries that the International Commission of Jurists
analyzes include Argentina (after the military coup of 1976), Canada (uses of the War
Measures Act in the twentieth century), Colombia (long history of coups), "Eastern Europe"
(characteristic features of the communist takeovers in East-Central Europe), Ghana
(emergencies after independence), Greece (the coup of the generals from 1967-1974), India
(the first three proclamations of emergency after independence), Malaysia (in the 1960s and
1970s), Northern Ireland (and British emergency rule there), Peru (emergencies since 1932),
Syria (the 1962 coup), Thailand (declarations of emergency between 1932-1979), Turkey
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dangerous it is to think about emergency government simply as a short-term
burst of anti-constitutional activity that is easily reined in by an active
parliament in a matter of a few days or weeks. Instead, the more common
pattern is for a crisis to trigger a prolonged state of abnormal governance in
which constitutional procedures are routinely violated.
Among countries that have not explicitly constitutionalized a detailed
emergency regime, and even among those that have, there are also clear
tendencies for emergency powers to exceed the depth and duration of the
threats that brought them into being. The United States itself has certainly
experienced over its history the temptations of emergency rule and also
permitted extraordinary presidential powers long after the ends of the wars
that provided the rationales for using emergency powers in the first place. 31
Many of the United States' European allies have been tempted by the siren
song of emergency powers to use them beyond their initial justification and
beyond their original subject-matters. Britain's multi-decade campaign
against the Irish Republican Army created long-term constitutional damage
not limited just to Northern Ireland.32 The Basque separatist movement in
Spain, fought in part through terrorism, eventually resulted in the delisting
of the political wing of the movement, making its peaceful representation in
the national Parliament impossible. 33
What this limited survey tells us is that most governments that go down
the state-of-emergency path remain in a state of emergency even longer
than one would gather from the threat that generated the need for the
emergency in the first place. Legal mechanisms meant to be invoked only
briefly in a time of emergency are either never formally used in the first
place or fail to be brief if they are invoked. During emergencies, and often
for long periods of time, parliaments are disabled or disable themselves;
courts defer or are suspended, limited, or ignored. The history of
democratic states in fighting terrorism is often depressing. Only recently
have states that have experienced not only terrorism but also their own
hard-to-control overreactions have attempted to bring their own powers
within the discipline of law. We do not yet know whether the new forms of
constitutional control will work when a crisis strikes.
(states of exception from 1960-1980), Uruguay (the fourteen-year state of emergency that
started in 1968), and Zaire (1960-1980).
31. Even in the United States, the emergency powers given to President Woodrow
Wilson during the First World War were withdrawn from him by a vote of the Congress after
the war was over. Wilson killed the law that would have taken away these powers with a
pocket veto. After the Second World War, many of the emergency powers granted to
Roosevelt during the war did not lapse until 1953. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Small
Emergencies, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 835, 847-51 (2006); Scheppele, North American Emergencies,
supra note 24, at 219-28 (2006).
32. See generally Kieran McEvoy & John Morison, Beyond the "Constitutional
Moment": Law, Transition, and Peacemaking in Northern Ireland, 26 Fordham Int'l L.J.
961 (2003).
33. See generally Kenneth Craig Dobson, The Spanish Government's Ban of a Political
Party: A Violation of Human Rights?, 9 New Eng. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 637 (2003).
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As a result, the biggest problem with actually existing emergencies, as
Ackerman understands full well, is figuring out how to live with them, as
well as how to end them. Campaigns against terrorism are not over in a
day, a week, or even the forty-five days of Ackerman's permitted
preventive detention. As long as a threat appears to continue-and terrorist
threats are typically of the long-term, grindingly persistent sort-it is hard
to end emergency powers quickly. If the United States, and much of the
rest of the world, is in the business of fighting terrorists over years and
perhaps even decades-as I think is in fact the case-then we should not be
looking primarily for emergency measures to be used in the first month or
two after an attack. We need to think about how to maintain a serious fight
against a threat over the long haul without destroying our constitutional
order in the meantime. As a result, we need to think about how to build
into our constitutional system more enduring measures for fighting
terrorism while maintaining an ongoing constitutional system. The threat
that the United States and others confront is not the threat that Ackerman
fears most. We do not need a short-term exception to the constitutional
order just to handle the threat of a second strike. Instead, we need durable,
constitutionally responsible institutions that can fight long-term threats
without undermining the constitutional system over a depressingly long
period of time.
In looking to other countries' experiences with terrorism, then, I suggest
we do not look at what constitutions and laws authorized for the panicked
period in the immediate aftermath of an attack. Instead, we should consider
ways to institutionalize a fight against terrorism without sacrificing core
constitutional principles. Fighting terrorism sits uneasily with ongoing
constitutional governance, but the experience of other states tells us how we
might design institutions to have minimal impact on constitutional
government, on respect for rights and separation of powers, and on the
realization of enduring principles for which constitutional governments
stand. The way to do this is to concentrate the most constitutionally
dangerous powers used in fighting terrorism in compact parts of the state,
walled off from the parts of the state that will go on operating in a
nonemergency fashion. These compact parts of the state-security agencies
and terrorism investigation offices-themselves need to be strictly
controlled by law with robust opportunities for oversight that honors both
separation of powers across political institutions and the need for multiparty
checks on power. And, of course, the protection of human rights and civil
liberties needs to be maintained, even in the middle of the period of danger,
with any deviations publicly justified and with state officials who are
tempted to use constitutional shortcuts held to high standards of public
accountability.
Although the amount we can learn from others' experiences with
terrorism is vast, in this short comment, I will limit myself to just two
lessons: (1) the need for explicit and detailed statutory regulation of
security agencies and their firm placement inside, rather than outside the
[Vol. 75
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constitutional order; and (2) the importance of designing institutions to
generate and preserve expertise on terrorism so that the state can
concentrate terrorism investigations in a relatively small team of people
who know where to look in a focused way for relevant information. Why
these two? Security agencies will have an important role to play in the
context of stealthy threats. They need to see a threat coming and work out
ways to fight it as a preventive matter. They need to do this, however,
without abusing their powers and without scanning further afield than the
threat warrants. But in order for the security agencies to do this (and here is
the relevance of my second point), a state needs ways to gather narrowly
relevant information and to concentrate threat-related knowledge in the
minds of as small of a circle of experts as possible with as broad a
commitment to nonpartisan oversight as possible. If both security agencies
and expertise about terrorism are walled off from other institutions that may
exercise powers against citizens and residents of states, if they are insulated
from party politics and political division, if they are subject to oversight
from multiple sources, and if they are run on the basis of expertise rather
than political mandates, then there might be a chance of preserving a
constitutional order even while a state is fighting a real and insidious threat.
II. ANTITERRORISM LESSONS FROM ABROAD
A. The Design of Security Agencies
The difference between fighting terrorism and fighting crime is generally
thought to be that one generally apprehends criminals after the fact and one
wants to stop terrorists before they strike. 34 Of course the difference is not
really so sharp: Many planned crimes-especially violent crimes that have
many victims-should be interrupted in advance and one would of course
want to arrest terrorists after the fact if they got that far. But those who
want to set constitutions aside in response to terrorism say that the "crime
model" for fighting terrorism does not work precisely because one needs to
gather intelligence long before one knows for certain the danger posed by
the specific target of the surveillance or questioning. 35 Instead, they believe
34. For a discussion of the "war model" versus the "crime model" for dealing with
terrorism, see Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a
Democratic Society (2000) and Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 457 (2002).
35. George W. Bush's State of the Union Address in January 2004 made the case against
the crime model:
I know that some people question if America is really in a war at all. They view
terrorism more as a crime, a problem to be solved mainly with law enforcement
and indictments. After the World Trade Center was first attacked in 1993, some of
the guilty were indicted and tried and convicted, and sent to prison. But the matter
was not settled. The terrorists were still training and plotting in other nations, and
drawing up more ambitious plans. After the chaos and carnage of September the
1 th, it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers. The terrorists and
their supporters declared war on the United States, and war is what they got.
2006]
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an antiterrorism campaign should be fought more like a war, with
intelligence playing a crucial role in surveying the horizon for potential
threats before they materialize. 36 Given the vagueness of terrorist threats
and the precision of criminal procedure, intelligence-gathering cannot
follow the rules of criminal investigation-or so advocates of expanded
police powers say; one must be able to poke around to see what is going on
before one knows something concrete enough to get warrants or obtain
judicial oversight to investigate. 37
How can intelligence agencies have the scope they need to detect threats
before they materialize while still preserving constitutional protections that
protect individual privacy, maintain limits on state action, and insist that no
individual be targeted for surveillance or investigation unless there is an
individuated suspicion that the target of the surveillance or investigation has
done something wrong? The United States has not had a good track record
of accomplishing both at once; the imperatives for surveillance and
investigation during the enduring and vague threats of the Cold War quickly
turned into mass abuse of civil liberties. 38 The controlling statutes that
were put in place to prevent such abuses have been bypassed since the
beginning of the United States' "war on terrorism." 39 Do we have models
that have done better?
President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/0 1/20040120-7.html.
36. Richard A. Best, Jr., Cong. Research Serv., RL30252, Intelligence and Law
Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S. 8 (Dec. 2001), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL30252.pdf#search=%22potential%20threats%20intelligence%2
Ogathering%22 ("In the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, some attention
was given to the question of whether the Osama bin Laden network in Afghanistan should be
dealt with as a law enforcement or a military matter. The Bush Administration, unable to
persuade Afghan authorities to arrest and hand over Bin Laden, quickly decided on a
military option supported by covert intelligence units.").
37. For the history of the distinction between criminal investigation and intelligence
gathering, see William C. Banks, And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret Surveillance
After the Terror, 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 1147 (2003).
38. The documentation of the abuses of the FBI in domestic spying can be found most
authoritatively in Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities of the U.S. Senate, Book II: Intelligence Activities and the Rights of
Americans, S. Rep. No. 94-755, at 5-20 (1976) (summarizing the illegal covert surveillance
action carried out over several decades, describing the FBI's COINTELPRO program, which
was "designed to 'disrupt' groups and 'neutralize' individuals deemed to be threats to
domestic security," and exposing the massive surveillance program that existed against
Americans during the reign of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover) [hereinafter Church
Committee Report].
39. This is most obvious in the case of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),
Pub. L. No. 95-511, tit. I, 101, 92 Stat. 1783 (1983) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11
(2000)), which set up a system of alternative warrants to be used in intelligence
investigations when the evidence available to investigators did not rise to the level of
probable cause that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed. President
Bush, however, decided to go around this system with his own surveillance program,
designed, carried out, and continued without any input from either Congress or the courts.
See David Sanger, In Address, Bush Says He Ordered Domestic Spying, N.Y. Times, Dec.
18, 2005, at Al.
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While no national security apparatus is free of problems, the institution
that seems to have had the best track record on both fighting terrorism and
preserving civil liberties is the German domestic security service, named
appropriately enough, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution
(Bundesamt fur Verfassungschutz or BfV). 40 The BfV is responsible for
counterespionage activities within Germany and is also charged with
monitoring a wide variety of domestically based extremist groups. It is
institutionally housed within the Federal Ministry of the Interior and is
based in Cologne.41
Why would I suggest looking to the BfV for a model? There are several
reasons. First, the BfV's statutory mandate is explicit and limited.42 Unlike
the FBI, which has never had a framework statute setting out its powers and
mechanisms of accountability, and which instead is guided by a series of
Attorney General's Guidelines that can be changed without legislative
debate or approval, 43 the BfV has a detailed statutory mandate that sets out
precisely what it can and cannot do. The statute provides the
democratically determined guidelines for the institution, outlines a clear
legal framework for the operation of intelligence gathering, and allows the
public to recognize when and how intelligence gathering may occur. The
40. This discussion of the Bundesamt fur Verfassungschutz (BfV) and its role in the
German policing and intelligence community is drawn in part from Kim Lane Scheppele,
Other People's Patriot Acts: Europe's Response to September 11, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 89, 98-
117 (2004).
41. One of the interesting aspects of German separation of powers, copied by a number
of countries, is that institutional separation of powers is often accompanied by physical
separation of the institutions in different geographical locations. This means that the
occupants of the various offices tend not to socialize with each other, which increases the
institutional separation. As Jane Kramer, writing in the New Yorker, states,
In a country still so nervous about displays of power that it is considered unseemly
even to talk about turning Berlin's Philharmonic into a national orchestra, it isn't
surprising that most of the people charged with identifying, investigating,
arresting, and prosecuting terrorists don't usually get anywhere near the capital, or
even anywhere near one another. Germany has as many spies and cops as the next
country. Eight thousand people are attached to the Verfassungsschutz and the
B.N.D. [the Federal Intelligence Service, handling foreign intelligence
investigations], five thousand to the B.K.A. [the federal police agency, handling
criminal cases]. But the old Allied imperative of 1949-power in Germany must
never again be centralized-still holds. The Verfassungsschutz is headquartered in
Cologne; the B.N.D. in Pullach, about half an hour from Munich; the Federal
Prosecutor in Karlsruhe; the B.K.A. in Wiesbaden; and the state security offices of
the B.K.A. in a town called Meckenheim, in North Rhine-Westphalia, which most
Germans have yet to locate on a map.
Jane Kramer, Letter from Europe: Germany's Troubled War on Terrorism, New Yorker,
Feb. 11,2002, at 36.
42. A machine-based translation of the Federal Constitution Protection law is available
at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/germany/does/bverfg.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2006)
[hereinafter Federal Constitution Protection Law]. The law can be found in German at
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bverfschg/index.html.
43. For the current guidelines in force, see Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., Attorney
General Guidelines on FBI Investigations,
http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/guidelines.shtml (last visited Oct. 28, 2006).
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mandate of the agency is out in the open, and it operates according to
publicly vetted and publicly accountable rules.
Second, the office carries out its investigations in the initial stages
through the use of publicly available documents and methods available to
all (for example, agents attend public meetings, read newspapers, carry out
surveillance of subjects in public places, or conduct voluntary interviews).
Only when BfV officials have a clear basis for suspicion may the
organization also use agents to infiltrate groups, engage in postal checks or
electronic surveillance, and use surreptitious photography. 44 But each of
these more intrusive and worrisome exercises of surveillance powers are
themselves subject to strict legal requirements. For example, the control of
electronic surveillance is conducted by a system of parliamentary
committees under Article 10 of the Basic Law (which is discussed below).45
Third, the powers of the BfV are strictly separated from ordinary policing
powers. The BfV is not authorized to carry out arrests, physical searches of
premises, nonconsensual interrogations, or seizure of objects. If such things
are deemed necessary by the BfV, then they must ask other state agencies
that do have such powers to carry out those tasks on behalf of the BfV.
These other agencies-usually the police acting under the authority of a
court or public prosecutor-will engage in those activities only if they
independently decide such actions are warranted.46 This double check on
intelligence procedures requires a different set of eyes and priorities to
review all requests for the most severely rights-affecting measures that can
be taken against someone. Because the BfV is institutionally separated
from the federal police but requires their cooperation in certain matters, the
BfV cannot conduct unlimited investigations but must justify their requests
for more information or for action to another agency.
Fourth, this organization of intelligence gathering has a substantial
system of parliamentary and judicial checks. 47 The Parliamentary Control
Commission, which supervises the entire intelligence apparatus in which
the BfV is one part, consists of nine members from the Bundestag, the
lower house of the German Parliament.48 Five of the nine are elected from
within the governing coalition, and four are elected from among the
opposition parties. 49 The chairmanship of the committee rotates at six-
month intervals between the government and opposition parties. 50 The
44. Federal Constitution Protection Law, supra note 42.
45. Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 10(2) (F.R.G.), translated in The Basic Law,
supra note 22, at 90-92.
46. See Kim Lane Scheppele, supra note 40, at 109-10.
47. For the BfV's own documentation of the mechanisms that control it, see Bundesamt
ftir Verfassungsshutz, Control,
http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/en-aboutbfv/control.html.
48. Shlomo Shpiro, Parliament, Media and the Control of the Intelligence Services in
Germany, in Democracy, Law and Security: Internal Security Services in Contemporary
Europe 294, 298 (Jean-Paul Brodeur et al. eds., 2003).
49. See id.
50. See id.
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government must report all intelligence activities to this committee, which
must itself report to the Bundestag once every two years. 5 1 The committee
has access to a substantial amount of classified information that is removed
from its required public reports. 52
As a result of this reporting requirement, there is a substantial separation-
of-powers check on the operation of the intelligence services. Furthermore,
because the leadership of the oversight committee rotates between the
parliamentary majority and the parliamentary opposition, there is also a
political check on the intelligence services as well. Even though the
constitutional system in Germany ensures that the Chancellor will always
have majority support in the Bundestag, the system of parliamentary
oversight presupposes that the opposition parties must be able to check that
the majority parties are not using the intelligence services for their own
political purposes.
In addition to the Parliamentary Control Commission, there are two
committees that have been established under Article 10 of the Constitution,
which protects the privacy of communications. 53 These committees review
surveillance practices of both the intelligence services and the police. 54 The
G-10 Gremium (named in honor of Article 10 of the Constitution) consists
of nine members of the Bundestag. 55 It meets every six months to review
and direct general policies about interception of mail, wiretaps, and other
forms of electronic intercepts. 56 The G-10 Commission consists of four
legal experts (and four alternates) who are nominated by their political
parties and meet together with representatives from the intelligence services
about once per month.57 This group reviews the legality of each individual
domestic communications intercept and has the right to suspend any
individual intercept if it appears that the evidence sustaining it is weak or if
the intercept infringes any law. 58 The committee even reviews the list of
"hit words" that computers use in strategic surveillance to determine which
specific conversations to turn over for human attention. 59 In addition to
these ways of reviewing surveillance strategies, there is also the permanent
possibility for the Bundestag to set up a special investigating committee if
any particular surveillance practice generates concern. 60
51. Id.
52. Id. at 299.
53. Id. at 300.
54. See id. at 300-01.
55. Id. at 300.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 301.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 301-02.
60. Id. at 304-05. In addition to the possibility of setting up new and specialized
constitutional commissions, two regular but separate parliamentary committees are charged
with overseeing the budgets of the intelligence agencies, and the books of the agencies can
be reviewed as well by a select group within the Federal Audit Office. Id. at 302-04.
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The judiciary is generally active in controlling the potentially far-
reaching powers of the domestic intelligence agencies. But the amendment
to Article 10 of the Basic Law in 1968, permitting electronic interception of
communications pursuant to a warrant and subject to review by a
parliamentary committee, limited judicial review of ongoing surveillance. 61
This limitation on judicial review during an ongoing communications
intercept was challenged in the Federal Constitutional Court, which upheld
the general substitution of parliamentary review for judicial review,
although the existence of at least some judicial supervision no doubt made a
difference to the Court.62 Further challenged in the European Court of
Human Rights, the limitation on judicial review of surveillance divided that
Court. But there, too, the Court eventually approved parliamentary review
as the main form of oversight on ongoing electronic surveillance. 63
Even with parliamentary review largely substituting for judicial review in
these cases, however, an individual who suspects that she is under
surveillance may not only challenge the practice before the parliamentary
commission supervising surveillance, but may also lodge a complaint
directly with the Federal Constitutional Court. The Court may then ask the
government for evidence of such surveillance, which the government is
required to provide. The government may, however, provide the
information in camera to the Court, which may itself only decide to make
the information public by a two-thirds vote.64 But, under these special
circumstances, there is constitutional review of individual surveillance
protocols.
In addition to this constitutional option, other legal remedies may also be
invoked by an individual who believes he or she is under surveillance:
If the person concerned is notified [of the surveillance], after the measures
have been discontinued, that he has been subject to surveillance, several
legal remedies against the interference with his rights become available to
him. According to the information supplied by the [German] Government
[to the European Court of Human Rights], the individual may: ... in an
action for a declaration, have reviewed by an administrative court
61. The Basic Law provides,
(2) Restrictions [on the privacy of communications] may only be ordered pursuant
to a statute. Where a restriction serves the protection of the free democratic basic
order or the existence or security of the Federation or a State [Land], the statute
may stipulate that the person affected shall not be informed and that recourse to the
courts shall be replaced by a review of the case by bodies and auxiliary bodies
appointed by Parliament.
Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 10(2) (F.R.G.), translated in The Basic Law, supra
note 22, at 21.
62. Judgment of Dec. 15, 1970 (Privacy of Communications (Klass) case),
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 30 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfGE] 1 (F.R.G.), translated in part in Donald Kommers,
The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 228-29 (2d ed. 1997).
63. Klass v. Federal Republic of Germany, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214 (1978).
64. For a description in English of the constitutional remedies available to an individual
under Article 10 of the Basic Law, see id. at 223-34.
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declaration, the legality of the application to. him of the G 10 and the
conformity with the law of the surveillance measures ordered; bring an
action for damages in a civil court if he has been prejudiced; bring an
action for the destruction or, if appropriate, restitution of documents;
finally, if none of these remedies is successful, apply to the Federal
Constitutional Court for a ruling as to whether there has been a breach of
the Basic Law.6 5
The sticking point in this system of judicial review, however, is that not all
of those who have been under surveillance will be notified that they have
been so observed when the surveillance ends. This is where the
parliamentary review becomes effectively the only substantial check on
executive power.
That said, however, the Federal Constitutional Court has been quite
aggressive in reviewing the constitutionality of general measures that may
infringe on personal privacy. When the Basic Law was amended in 1998 to
permit "technical means of eavesdropping" (bugging) in the home if the
order to do so were issued by a panel of three judges,66 the Court reviewed
the law that the Bundestag passed along with the constitutional amendment
to bring the new regime of home surveillance into effect. In a sweeping
decision in 2004-after the "war on terrorism" was well underway-the
Federal Constitutional Court held that the new statute violated the Basic
Law.67 Why? Because the principle of human dignity and the right to the
inviolability of the home counseled stricter limitations on home surveillance
than the law had set.68 In particular, since "bugs" were indifferent to the
nature of the conversation being monitored, the Court ruled that their use
was unconstitutional insofar as they might take in protected conversations
between spouses, among close friends, or between a person and his lawyer,
clergyman, or doctor.69 In addition, the Court ruled that any accidentally
captured intimate conversations must be deleted immediately, and that
surveillance could be permitted in the first place only when the crimes that
suspects were thought to have been engaged in reached a high level of
seriousness. 70 All of these were reasons to send the law back to the
Bundestag for extensive revision.
65. Id. at 224.
66. Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 13(3)-(7) (F.R.G.), translated in The Basic
Law, supra note 22, at 23-24.
67. Grol3er Lauschangriff, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional
Court] Mar. 3, 2004, 109 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfGE] 279
(F.R.G.). For a detailed description in English of the ruling of the Court, see Nicolas
Nohlen, Germany: The Electronic Eavesdropping Case, 3 I-Con: Int'l J. Const. L. 680
(2005). For the context within which the decision was made, see generally Verena Z6ller,
Liberty Dies by Inches: German Counter-Terrorism Measures and Human Rights, 5 Germ.
L.J. (2004), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=425#_ednrefl 1.
68. Nohlen, supra note 67, at 682.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 685.
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In addition to these formal mechanisms of checking investigative powers,
the press in Germany enjoys substantial constitutional and statutory
protection to investigate intelligence and policing practices. Not only is
freedom of the press guaranteed in the Constitution, 7' but there is an
explicit constitutional prohibition on censorship. 72 By statute, the press is
guaranteed confidentiality of sources and informants, as well as immunity
from police eavesdropping and searches of editorial offices. 73 As a result,
media coverage of the police and intelligence services is quite common,
detailed, and critical. And because the intelligence services have not been
scandal-free, this media check has been quite useful. 74
Even with all of the checks that the German system places on
surveillance power, however, there are still strong suspicions that this
power cannot be controlled in ways that protect constitutional rights
adequately. As Verena Z61ler has shown, the eighty-percent increase in
telephone taps between 1996 and 2001 is hard to account for, as is the fact
that only twenty-five percent of these taps ever led to someone being
charged with a crime. 75 Nearly sixty-five percent of those who were
convicted of a crime based on telephone tap evidence were sentenced to less
than five years in prison, suggesting that the crimes in question were not
serious enough to warrant such an intrusion on privacy in the first place. 76
About seventy-five percent of those placed under surveillance were never
formally notified of the fact, which made later judicial vindication of their
privacy rights difficult.77  Z61ler takes these statistics as evidence that
surveillance power, once granted and even with many constitutional checks,
can still run amok.78
As we can see, then, the constitutional control of extraordinary powers is
extraordinarily difficult to achieve. Even the checks that the German
system places on these powers may not always work. That said, and
remembering why we started down this road in the first place, it is almost
surely the case that the German system is likely to lead to less abuse of
rights than the present American system in which the system of checks is
much weaker. Even the German system of oversight, review, and
accountability cannot guarantee that there will be no abuses, as Z61ler's
disturbing statistics show. But they are certainly better than assuming
71. The Basic Law provides,
(1) Everyone has the right to freely express and disseminate his opinion in speech,
writing, and pictures and to freely inform himself from generally accessible
sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts
and films are guaranteed. There may be no censorship.
Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 5(1) (F.R.G.), translated in The Basic Law, supra note
22, at 19.
72. Id.
73. Shpiro, supra note 48, at 306.
74. See id. at 305-08.
75. Z61ler, supra note 67, at 483-83.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 483.
78. Id.
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either that an executive can be trusted with all powers or that the security
services themselves will know a constitutional violation when they see one.
B. The Concentration of Expertise
How else might a country fight terrorism for the long haul without
upending its constitutional sensibility? As we will see from examining the
experience of other countries, it is often beneficial both for effectiveness
and for civil liberties to concentrate terrorism investigations in a group of
people who are institutionally separated from ordinary criminal
investigations and ordinary intelligence gathering. Such experts should be
able to concentrate only on terrorism investigations without getting drawn
into other matters. Expert terrorism investigators can use their expertise to
sort the information that is crucial from the information that is misleading, a
feature of expertise that turns out also to be beneficial for civil liberties. It
also helps if these terrorism investigators are not connected directly to the
executive branch of government, which may have its own agendas for
investigation.
Since 9/11, however, the United States has not only not concentrated
terrorism investigations in small, relatively independent, expert
communities, but it has done just the opposite. The most experienced
antiterrorism prosecutors in the United States, the U.S. Attorney's office for
the Southern District of New York, had successfully prosecuted nearly three
dozen defendants accused of al-Qaeda-connected terror attacks before
9/11. 79  But after 9/11, the attack-related prosecutions of Zacarias
Moussaoui and John Walker Lindh were moved to the Eastern District of
Virginia, away from the place where the experience was concentrated and
into a venue where prosecutors had to start over with basic information
about al-Qaeda, its organization, and its reach. 80  New antiterrorism
regulations were turned over for enforcement to people with virtually no
experience. The enforcement of a whole slew of banking regulations
designed to fight terrorism, for example, was given over at the start to
completely inexperienced investigators. 81  Despite attempting to create
concentrations of expertise within the FBI, the effort has been plagued with
inadequate staffing, high turnover and lack of experienced translators. 82
Five different people held the top terrorism job at the FBI between 9/11 and
79. "We saw the prosecutions as one of the means to prevention. I guess we locked up
over 35 very dangerous terrorists." The Abrams Report (MSNBC television broadcast Dec.
17, 2002) (transcript available on Lexis (transcript #121700cb.464) and on file at the
Fordham Law Review).
80. Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1001, 1029
(2004).
81. "'I have never worked on a terrorism investigation in my life,' said one senior
federal government financial investigator with 24 years of service." Jimmy Bums & Richard
Wolffe, Huge Obstacles in Global Search for Terrorist Paper Trail, Fin. Times, Sept. 24,
2001, at 6.
82. Philip Shenon, 9/11 Panel Criticizes Reform Effort at the F.B.I., N.Y. Times, Oct.
21, 2005, at A19.
20061
FORDHAMLAWREVIEW
the end of 2004.83 At the CIA, after 9/11, many senior analysts left. 84 The
United States has had such turnover in the top terrorism analyst positions
that it has been hard to accumulate and analyze the narrowly relevant
information that would be useful in preventing attacks.
At the same time, the Bush Administration has launched a program that
uses the opposite of concentrated expertise. It is a program of
indiscriminate mass data collection using computer-based techniques for
sorting through mountains of records. The records themselves are
generated by vacuum-cleaner-like collection methods that sweep up
everything in their path. The government has created databases that
accumulate information on millions of people, when only a few of them, at
best, would be reasonable suspects. "Data mining" techniques are then
employed to find correlated connections between suspects and others who
overlap them. The correlations may well be due to chance in this sea of
data. The National Security Agency has gathered a huge database of
telephone records;85 the Transportation Safety Authority's Computer
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System collected information about all
passengers on all commercial airlines regardless of individuated
suspicion--or at least it did so before Congress ordered it to be revised
(though not eliminated);86 the Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information
Exchange program (MATRIX) that links state criminal data to commercial
databases with credit card information has also engendered controversy. 87
The Analysis, Dissemination, Visualization, Insight, and Semantic
Enhancement (ADVISE) program within the Department of Homeland
Security links information available from a diverse array of sources to
create one of the largest databases in the world-all in the service of
83. Richard B. Schmitt, Exodus of Staff Hobbles the FBI, L.A. Times, Dec. 13, 2004, at
Al.
84. James Rosen, Bush Takes Risk with Pick for CIA Boss, Scripps Howard News
Service, May 8, 2006, available at
http://www.shns.com/shns/g-index2.cfm?action=detail&pk=CIA-05-08-06.
85. According to Daniel Prieto,
In May 2006, it was revealed that the NSA was augmenting domestic surveillance
with large-scale data analysis of consumer telephone toll records. That revelation
was only the latest instance of government efforts to use data mining and other
technology in the war on terror.... There is ongoing controversy over the
government's use of private-sector and consumer data for counterterrorism
purposes.
Homeland Security: The Next Five Years: Written Testimony Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 14-15 (2006) (testimony of
Daniel B. Prieto, Senior Fellow and Director of the Homeland Security Center of the Reform
Institute).
86. The Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) was shut down by
Congress over privacy concerns and replaced by the Secure Flight system. Jeffrey W.
Seifert, Cong. Research Serv., RL31798, Data Mining and Homeland Security: An
Overview 7-10 (Jan. 27, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL31798.pdf.
87. Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Anti-Terror Database Got Show at White House, Wash. Post,
May 21, 2004, at A12.
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looking for terrorists. 88 Of the five publicly known data-mining efforts that
the U.S. government has conducted in the "war on terror," none complied
with federal privacy law by assessing privacy impacts of their practices,
according to a Government Accountability Office (formerly the
Government Accounting Office) audit. 89
There are two problems with constantly rotating terrorism investigators
and fishing through large databases as a substitute for following concrete
leads through old-fashioned police work. The first is that many more
innocent people may fall into the net of terrorism investigations because
those who cast the net are not experienced enough to sort out real leads
from alarming coincidences. As a result, there are likely to be a great many
"false positives," which-in less neutral language-amount to civil liberties
violations. The second is that such investigations are less likely to succeed
at stopping actual plots than patient investigative work.90
How else might information on terrorism and terrorists be gathered and
used with fewer assaults on data privacy and with a greater likelihood of
spotting only real suspects and not coincidental innocents? Here, too, we
might look abroad for models. In a number of European countries,
terrorism investigations are concentrated in the hands of small numbers of
specialists who stay at their jobs for long periods of time, developing a
sense of how terrorists operate, how terrorist networks grow and change,
and what constitutes a growing threat. In Spain and France, the two places
where such experts are most famous, these "investigating magistrates" are
located outside the executive branch and in the judiciary. Though some of
their specific powers are controversial in any human rights analysis,91 the
structural setup of their offices does not necessarily entail granting them the
most controversial powers of investigation.
88. Mark Clayton, US Plans Massive Data Sweep, Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 9,
2006, at 1.
89. Matthew B. Stannard, U.S. Phone-Call Database Ignites Privacy Uproar: Data
Mining: Commonly Used in Business To Find Patterns, It Rarely Focuses on Individuals,
S.F. Chron., May 12, 2006, at Al.
90. In Germany, data mining after 9/11 that examined the personal data of all university
students in the country produced no useful leads. See Ronald D. Lee & Paul M. Schwartz,
Beyond the "War" on Terrorism: Towards the New Intelligence Network, 103 Mich. L.
Rev. 1446, 1472 n.74 (2005). At least this data mining was authorized by a judge,
something that has not happened in the United States. But while data mining turned up
nothing, German police used normal police methods to detect and arrest two student
members of the al-Qaeda cell in Hamburg who had participated in planning the 9/11 attacks
themselves. For information on the trials of these two suspects see Kim Lane Scheppele,
The Metastasis of Torture: Circulating Coerced Knowledge in the Anti-Terror Campaign
(unpublished manuscript on file with author and the Fordham Law Review).
91. See Alexandrine Bouilhet, Belgium Criticizes French Leaks, Le Figaro, Dec. 2,
2005, translated in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Dec. 2, 2005, available at LEXIS ("'The
French antiterrorist judiciary have their own laws,' the chairman of the [Belgian
correctional] court, Pierre Hendrickx, said. 'The police can hold a suspect for 96 hours.
They make arrests both by day and by night, and can arrest wives in order to make their
husbands talk, entirely legally. These are their methods. Not ours."').
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Investigating magistrates, in the French and Spanish systems, perform
some of the functions of grand juries in the United States: 92 questioning
witnesses, probing for evidence, trying to work out if a crime has been (or
was about to be) committed. In the United States, a prosecutor (who is tied
to the executive branch in the federal system) works with a jury of lay
people to uncover evidence, while in France and Spain, chief investigators
are part of the judiciary and work with their own teams of investigators (and
sometimes their own teams of police) to investigate crimes.9 3
The relative independence of the investigating magistrate has a certain
advantage in antiterrorism campaigns. Antiterrorism campaigns can
quickly devolve into general emergencies in which power is heavily
concentrated in the hands of executives. As a result, having the
investigative power lodged in a judiciary that is free of direct executive
interference is a check on the concentration of executive power at such a
time. 94 In addition, if investigative magistrates are to have relatively broad
powers of investigation, it is best to detach them from the overtly political
branches that might have agendas like suppressing electoral competition
and using the spoils of government for personal or party-political purposes.
The danger of such positions is that they can become too independent,
spinning out of any meaningful control by any other part of the government.
In both Spain and France, the logic of jurisdiction has concentrated
terrorism investigations in the hands of particular now-famous investigative
judges: Jean-Louis Brugui~re in France and Baltasar Garz6n in Spain.
These two had been at their jobs for many years before 9/11 created a
specialized sort of panic. Brugui~re has been investigating Islamist radicals
since a series of bombs exploded in Paris in the mid-1980s. 95 After 9/11,
commentators noted that only Brugui~re warned before 9/11 that Islamic
radicals were interested in using airplanes to crash into crucial landmarks. 96
Garz6n sits as a judge in the Audencia Nacional, the Spanish "National
Court," which is tasked with handling international and organized crime.
His early work involved investigating domestic Spanish terrorism
(including the police abuse in fighting it) and he gained international fame
for attempting the extradition of General Augusto Pinochet to stand trial in
92. See Mary C. Daly, Some Thoughts on the Differences in Criminal Trials in the Civil
and Common Law Legal Systems, 2 J. Inst. Stud. Legal Ethics 65, 67 (1999) ("From the
accused's perspective, the most critical part of French criminal procedure is the pretrial
investigation. The 'real combat,' so to speak, takes place during the investigation. The trial
is anticlimactic. There is no grand jury in France. In its place is the investigating
magistrate.").
93. See Micah S. Myers, Note, Prosecuting Human Rights Violations in Europe and
America: How Legal System Structure Affects Compliance with International Obligations,
25 Mich. J. Int'l L. 211, 250 (2003).
94. In systems like France and Spain, it helps also that the judiciary is not overly
politicized because judgeships are awarded through a system very like a civil service merit
promotion system in which political influence has been minimized.
95. See Martin Arnold, 'Le Sheriff Warns of al-Qaeda Attack in Asia, Fin. Times, Aug.
26, 2005, at 6.
96. See id.
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Spain for human rights abuses against Spanish nationals in Chile.97 Garz6n
began investigating Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda in 199598 and has
handled many terrorism investigations after 9/11, famously charging bin
Laden in a 692-page indictment in 2003.99
Both men are controversial, and the sources of controversy must be
understood to assess whether their offices should be emulated. In general,
the worry is about concentrating too much power in too few hands, as well
as about the nature of the powers involved. The concentration of too much
power problem can be solved with strategic oversight. For example, in
France, investigating magistrates may indicate that a particular suspect
should be charged with a crime, but the charge does not stick unless a panel
of other judges reviews the evidence and agrees. 100 The sorts of oversight
we saw in Germany, where parliamentary committees review ongoing
investigations for signs of abuse, might also be employed in a system like
this.101
By far the biggest criticism of investigative magistrates, however, is of
the specific powers that they wield. The heavy use of preventive detention,
ethnic profiling, and interrogations without counsel have all prompted
concern about the way that the French have conducted antiterrorism
investigations. 102 In Spain, the permitted use of incommunicado detention
for up to thirteen days in terrorism cases has generated criticism from
human rights groups. 103
But these powers do not necessarily come with the territory of
investigative magistrates. Whether investigative magistrates should have
these powers is a separate question from whether lodging terrorism
investigations in the judiciary rather than in an executive-branch agency or
ministry is a good idea. All investigative institutions come with strong
potentials for abuse. It is only through designing effective oversight and
review mechanisms that the potential for abuse will remain unrealized. The
part of the investigative magistrate system that I want to praise as a model
is the part that allows a small team of people to specialize in uncovering
97. See Profile: Judge Baltasar Garz6n, BBC News, Sept. 26, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/3085482.stm [hereinafter, BBC Profile].
98. See Frontline: Interview: Baltasar Garz6n (PBS television broadcast July 27,
2004), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/map/garzon.html
(posting of translated excerpts from the television interview).
99. See BBC Profile, supra note 97.
100. Myers, supra note 93, at 251-252.
101. See supra notes 42-74.
102. See Craig Whitlock, French Push Limits in Fight on Terrorism: Wide Prosecutorial
Powers Draw Scant Public Dissent, Wash. Post, Nov. 2, 2004, at Al ("France has embraced
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terrorist activity over a long period of time, separate from direct executive-
branch control. The concentration of expertise in a relatively apolitical
location is likely, in my view, to increase the chances of locating real
terrorists while minimizing chances that the investigative powers will
expand to reach individuals and subject matters that are not proper objects
for such extraordinary powers.
CONCLUSION
When terror strikes, constitutional systems often go out of whack. Since
9/11, American legal analysts have rushed to propose ways to keep the
constitutional order in line while fighting terrorism. Bruce Ackerman's
writings on the subject-whether positioned before or after the next
attack-attempt to bring emergencies in from the cold, to normalize them
for brief periods in order to protect against a second attack, and then to
banish them from the operation of a stable constitutional order. His book
and article in this volume are premised on the idea that emergencies are
short-term crises that can be solved in a month or two before the normal can
reemerge. But perhaps it is a sobering thought to recall that the visible part
of the U.S. government did not rush to engage in extra-constitutional
activities on the day of 9/11 itself. Instead, it closed down. 104  This
suggests that the biggest threat is not the immediate aftermath, but the
longer drawn-out struggle that an attack may presage.
Most emergencies, particularly those involving terrorism, are much more
enduring than Ackerman suggests. They last not months, but years and
even decades; they poison constitutional systems by normalizing practices
that were unthinkable before the dark days of terror. That is why we need
to think about practices we can live with for the long haul. We need to
design institutions that are effective but not anti-constitutional, that are
subject to constitutional constraint from the moment that they appear, and
that are capable of being reigned in when they exceed their powers. While
even the institutions that I have suggested as models here-the German
domestic intelligence service and the French and Spanish system of
investigative magistrates-are not free from criticism or potential for abuse,
they do offer some ways to think about fighting terrorism while maintaining
a system of constitutional checks.
Perhaps the greatest danger at times of emergency is that all power tends
to flow toward the executive. Concentrated power is, as James Madison
described, "the essence of tyranny,' 10 5 The examples that I have suggested
here provide ways to spread power back through the legislative and judicial
branches at times of crisis. In so doing, they offer at least some
counterweight against the most likely source of internal threat. These
institutions, if correctly designed, would also improve effectiveness in
104. Steve Twomey, Security Heightened in D.C.: Government Shuts Down, Employees
Sent Home; 'It's Traumatizing, 'Wash. Post, Sept. 11, 2001, at A2.
105. The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison).
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detecting terror plots before they hatch because they permit focused
investigations based on concentratee expertise.
If we can design institutions after 9/11 that are compatible with
constitutional commitments to the separation of powers and the
preservation of rights, then we will not need to give up the Constitution to
fight terrorism. Instead, we can use this opportunity to remind ourselves
that
[t]he Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people,
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine,
involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of
man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the
great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy
or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for
the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it,
which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been happily proved
by the result of the great effort to throw off its just authority. 106
106. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 209 (1866).
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